Bill of Particulars

THE REPORTER OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA, INC.

National Legal Research Group, Inc. David Wagoner, J.D., Editor

Vol. 50, No. 8 **August 2024**

OUTGOING PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
BY LESA J. YEATTS

As I finish out the last few days of my presidency, I am reflecting on the past year, and I am struck with how fortunate the LGA is to have so many of you that contribute your time and talents to make this organization successful. I am proud to be a member of this organization as it enters its 50th year.

As President of the LGA, I have very little to do with its successes. The large majority of the substantive work of this organization is done by you members who, in addition to very demanding day

jobs, selflessly volunteer your time and considerable expertise to benefit every local government and local government lawyer in the state. Just in this past year, I made 117 appointments/reappointments to LGA Committees, and 56 of those were new appointments. Additionally, numerous member volunteers were appointed or nominated to state committees and LGA ad hoc committees. Thanks to all of the members who made the Leadership Program happen this year. Almost 40 LGA members participated in the inaugural two-day leadership seminar held in February.

I want to give a special thanks to my fellow officers and Board members. They are a great group of people who dedicate a great deal of time and effort to do all that needs to be done to run a successful professional organization. I have learned so much from all of you.

Finally, my everlasting appreciation to those who quietly and competently perform the important work to pull off everything from planning and running conferences for several hundred members to filing our corporate taxes. Thank you, to all the folks at Easter and the National Legal Research Group, but most especially Amy, Christy, Bill, and David. You are the best!

2024 FALL CONFERENCE

General Information

Registration for the 2024 LGA Fall Conference, to be held October 3-5 at the Hilton Norfolk The Main, opens this month on August 22. As planning progresses, information about the program and other details can be found on the LGA website, here. The room block will also open on August 22; link will be emailed with your registration confirmation.

Registrant Activities and Announcements

A variety of Friday afternoon activities are in the works, and we are finalizing the Opening Night party to ensure that members have ample opportunities for fellowship and networking. Please note that the registration forms request that you indicate the social events you plan to attend. While it would be great if every member attended every event, please help LGA staff with planning and budgeting by only checking the events that you truly plan to attend. Minimizing the number of "no-shows" will save the LGA thousands of dollars that can be spent on other meals, breaks, giveaways, and additional program features. Remember—***don't check, to reduce our check!***

Baskets Are Back!

This is your opportunity to show LGA colleagues why you love your town, city, county, firm, or organization! Gather items and pack them in a basket (you can be creative about what constitutes a "basket") with your locality, firm, or organization's name clearly displayed—and be sure to include a list of items, if they are difficult to identify. Conference attendees who sign up to attend the lunch awards banquet will be given a chance to vote for their favorite basket—and get a chance to take it home—by dropping a ticket into a bag next to their basket of choice. Drawings will be made during the lunch awards banquet on Friday, and winners must be present to win. The basket provider with the most tickets wins a special treat . . . and bragging rights! Consider donating today!

Here are some tips to keep in mind:

- *Develop a unifying, creative theme (e.g., relaxation and health, a taste of the area, or "my favorite things").*
- *Baskets should be easily transportable, securely contained, able to fit into a 2' × 3' area, and weigh less than 20 pounds. Be sure to deliver your basket to the registration desk by 4:00 p.m. on October 3.*
- *Don't want to lug a big basket? Consider a "basket" of gift cards instead!*

Contact Christy Jenkins at christy.jenkins@easterassociates.com to let us know that you will participate, or to ask any questions you might have.

ATTENTION ASSOCIATE MEMBERS!

Have you heard about the LGA's **Aggregate Membership Program**?

If your firm represents more than one locality, it qualifies for participation!

Private firms representing multiple localities can choose to participate in the aggregate membership program, both to help add to our membership directory and to list all of the localities that the firm represents. If a firm selects this new structure, its dues will be based on the total population of all the localities represented by the firm, and fees will coincide with the current active member dues rates listed on the membership application.

To enroll your firm in the Aggregate Membership Program, email Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com with a list of all localities that your firm represents, and designate the attorney who will act as the chief counsel for each locality. We will calculate the aggregate dues based on the most recent census, and provide an invoice.

Firms who opt into this member structure can also maintain an associate membership with the LGA, so the localities represented will be listed in the profiles of the firm's attorneys, and the attorneys' firm affiliation will be included in our programs and on our website.

If you have any questions regarding LGA membership and/or invoices, please contact Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com.

INTRODUCING OUR PARTNER PROGRAM

For almost 50 years, the LGA has served local government practitioners in the Commonwealth. This would not have been possible without the support received from our sponsor partners, which fund the administrative and educational operations of our organization. Until now, these functions have been supported separately by annual sponsors and conference supporters. However, because these operations are all under the LGA umbrella, the LGA Board has developed the Partner Program.

Our Partner Program streamlines sponsorship funding by asking for annual commitments by September 1 of each year. This timeframe will allow the LGA to identify available funding for the year, in order to plan programs and resources. This will also eliminate repetitive "asks" for conference-specific support but ensure that your support continues to be recognized during our programs.

We ask that you continue to partner with us under this new program, as we work to advance the professional growth and knowledge exchange among legal practitioners in local government law. Here is a link to opportunities.

If you have any questions about the program, are interested in supporting the LGA, or have a suggestion for leadership to consider, please reach out to Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com.

JOIN A COMMITTEE

The LGA cannot function and thrive without our committees—groups of members who, together, accomplish so much of the organization's important work. Unfortunately, our committee application database has been depleted!

Please apply now to participate in one (or more!) of our standing committees:

- **Amicus Briefs**;
- **Awards & Recognition**;
- **Conferences**;
- **Conference Policy**;
- **Ethics**;
- **Law School Liaison**;
- **Outreach**; and
- **Publications**.

Descriptions for each committee are in the application. The deadline is October 15 for appointments that will become effective January 1. The Fall Conference Committee for the Norfolk conference in October is set, but you can indicate your interest in serving on future conference committees.

If you would like to join one of the ad hoc committees (**Attorney Wellness** or **Belonging, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion**), you can indicate your interest in the "Additional Information" section of the application form.

Thank you for getting more involved in the LGA—it helps to keep us as a vibrant and meaningful organization. Your participation helps us grow! If you have any questions about the committees, contact Amy Sales at amy.sales@easteassociates.com.

Click here for the committee application form.

MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL IS UNDERWAY

On August 1, LGA Chief Counsels received a dues renewal invoice by email. Renew before the end of August to avoid any interruption in access to LGA benefits, which include the forums, *Handbook*, and Fall Conference registration, which opens on August 22 (we want to see you in Norfolk, October 3-5!).

If you are a Chief Counsel and did not receive a renewal notice, please contact Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com.

Not sure if you're a Chief Counsel, or have a question about membership? Please contact Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com.

When invoices were distributed, localities with populations between 15,001-50,000 and 50,001-100,000 received invoices listing incorrect dues amounts. Staff quickly recognized the issue, alerted Chief Counsels of localities in those population ranges, deleted the incorrect invoices, and distributed revised invoices.

If you want to verify your dues amount before payment is made, please contact Amy Sales at amy.sales@easterassociates.com.

MEMBER NEWS

WELCOME to the following new members of the LGA!

James Brooks Bruce, III (brooksjb@nnva.gov), Newport News City Attorney's Office

Juan Bustamante (juan.bustamante@fairfaxcounty.gov), Fairfax County Attorney's Office

Anne Convy (anne.convy@loudoun.gov), Loudoun County Attorney's Office

Catherine Kline Douglas (catherine@elderwatkins.com), Farmville Town Attorney's Office

Lachina Dovodova (lachina.dovodova@fairfaxcounty.gov), Fairfax County Attorney's Office

Andrew Lloyd (andrew.lloyd@henrico.k12.va.us), Henrico County Attorney's Office

Matthew E. Morse (mmorse@cityofchesapeake.Net), Chesapeake City Attorney's Office

CONGRATULATIONS to the following LGA members who have taken a new position or received a promotion!

Mark Flynn (markkflynn@gmail.com) is the new King William County Attorney

Kelley Kemp (kkemp@sandsanderson.com) is now with Sands Anderson

Amy Wilson (awilson@orangecountyva.gov) is the new Orange County Attorney

April Wimberley (wimberleya@charlottesville.gov) is now Deputy City Attorney for Charlottesville

VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT

PROPERTY DAMAGE • REDEVELOPMENT & HOUSING AUTHORITY • APPROBATE-REPROBATE DOCTRINE • SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY • GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS

Page v. Portsmouth Redev. & Hous. Auth., ___ Va. ___, 902 S.E.2d 751 (2024) (Kelsey, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The court of appeals incorrectly applied the approbate-reprobate doctrine against the landowner. (2) The municipal redevelopment and housing authority did not enjoy sovereign immunity from its proprietary act of razing the building.

DISCUSSION: The owner of a building in Portsmouth (landowner) sought restitution from the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA) for damages incurred when PRHA hired a private contractor to tear down the adjoining building. PRHA acquired its property in 2009, which was situated in a designated "slum and blight" area. The building situated on the land was badly deteriorated. In 2014, the City of Portsmouth issued a Notice of Emergency Demolition which stated that the building had been declared "dangerous" and gave PRHA two weeks to "abate the hazards." The landowner alleged that the negligently performed demolition process caused his building, which shared common wall, to incur damages to its supporting structures, interior wall surfaces, and roof, which also resulted in ongoing water damage. The circuit court dismissed the landowner's claim, finding that PRHA was entitled to sovereign immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed.

The Virginia Supreme Court held first that the court of appeals erroneously truncated its analysis by holding that the landowner violated the approbate-reprobate doctrine. The appeals court determined that the landowner had conceded in circuit court

proceedings that PRHA was "acting . . . on behalf of the [C]ity" and thus had waived his argument that the City's interest in demolition in order to protect the public welfare did not impute to PRHA. This was not so; the court of appeals misinterpreted a statement made by the landowner's counsel in open court, in which he explained the landowner's position that PRHA was "acting in [its] proprietary role on behalf of the [C]ity."

The court held second that, under these facts, PRHA was not immunized. Under Virginia law, a municipal redevelopment and housing authority can be held liable in tort while engaging in "proprietary functions" but not "governmental functions." *Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Hampton Redev. & Hous. Auth.*, 217 Va. 30, 225 S.E.2d 364 (1976). PRHA contended that the demolition of its unsafe building fell within the core police powers of a municipality, rendering it a governmental function. To the contrary, the landowner persuasively argued that PRHA's demolition constituted a proprietary function, focusing on its unsafe operation of the building for five years, and asserting that PRHA had no governmental discretion to maintain a public nuisance or to disobey the City's Notice. "The City—not PRHA—was exercising a governmental function by directing PRHA to fix or demolish the building. Acting in its proprietary capacity, PRHA had to obey the City's Notice of Emergency Demolition no differently than any other private landowner that owned a dilapidated building constituting an unlawful public nuisance."

Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

TAKINGS CLAUSE • DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT • WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY • JUSTICIABILITY

Sch. Bd. of Stafford Cnty. v. Sumner Falls Run, LLC, ___ Va. ___. 903 S.E.2d 242 (2024) (per curiam).

HOLDINGS: (1) The Declaratory Judgment Act is not a comprehensive waiver of sovereign immunity. (2) A declaratory judgment is proper for a claim based on a self-executing provision of the Virginia Constitution, provided that the case presents a justiciable controversy.

DISCUSSION: A property owner, concerned about the adverse effects that the construction of two new schools will have on an easement it owns and on the value of its property, filed a declaratory judgment action against the Stafford County School Board and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). It sought relief in the form of specific judicial declarations concerning the easement and that any taking of property beyond extending the current easement would violate the doctrine of necessity and is forbidden by Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The School Board and VDOT filed a plea of sovereign immunity, contending that this doctrine barred the property owner's declaratory judgment action. The circuit court held that the declaratory judgment action was not barred by sovereign immunity, prompting the Virginia Supreme Court's *de novo* review.

The court held first that the Declaratory Judgment Act, by itself, does not act as an across-the-board waiver of sovereign immunity, contrary to the circuit court's judgment.

The court held second that a declaratory judgment is allowed for a claim premised on a self-executing provision of the Virginia Constitution, provided that the case presents a justiciable controversy. As to VDOT, the declaratory judgment sought by the property owner did not implicate a self-executing provision of the Virginia Constitution, thereby entitling VDOT to sovereign immunity. As to the School Board, the property owner's declaratory judgment action was premature with respect to its takings claim since it did not allege that the Commonwealth or the School Board was on the cusp of damaging its property within the meaning of Article I, § 11. With regard to the property owner's allegation that the School Board planned to take more of its property than was necessary, it was not clear on the record whether this aspect of the declaratory judgment action was premature or justiciable. Further evidence was needed to resolve this point.

Therefore, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS

PROPERTY TAX LIEN • CODE § 58.1-3952(A) • SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Frederick County v. Va. Dep't of Treasury, 81 Va. App. 102, 902 S.E.2d 86 (2024) (Humphreys, J.).

HOLDING: The General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under Code § 58.1-3952.

DISCUSSION: In June 2022, the Treasurer of Frederick County (County) issued a lien notice and demand for payment to the Virginia Treasury Department's Unclaimed Property Division (Department), asserting that the Department held property belonging to an individual who owed the County nearly $1,000 in delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and fees. The County asked the Department to disburse the property to it in order to cover the debt, pursuant to Code § 58.1-3952(A). The Department did not respond to the lien notice. This appeal ensued following a circuit court's dismissal of the charge on the basis of the Department's sovereign immunity.

The appeals court held that the General Assembly clearly and explicitly waived sovereign immunity for this type of suit. The statute reads, in relevant part:

> The treasurer or other tax collector of any county, city or town may apply in writing to any person indebted to or having in his hands estate of a taxpayer or other debtor for payment of taxes, or other charges collected by the treasurer, more than thirty days delinquent out of such debt or estate. . . . The taxes, penalties and interest, or other charges shall constitute a lien on the debt or estate due the taxpayer or other debtor. . . . If the person applied to does not pay so much as ought to be recovered out of the debt or estate, the treasurer or collector shall procure a summons directing such person to appear before the appropriate court, where proper payment may be enforced. . . .For purposes of this section, the term "person" shall include . . . the Commonwealth and its agencies and political subdivisions. However, in no event shall the Commonwealth, its agencies, or its political subdivisions incur any liability for the failure to pay the treasurer's or other tax collector's application under this section.

Va. Code § 58.1-3952(A). By deliberately including the Commonwealth, its agencies, and political subdivisions as a "person," the legislature has expressly waived sovereign immunity in this circumstance. Thus, the plain language of the statute allows a county treasurer or tax collector to force the Department to appear in court, where the court may enforce payment of the tax lien.

Contrary to the position taken by the Department, the final sentence of this subsection does not immunize it from suit. Rather, the prohibition of courts from imposing "any liability" on the Commonwealth "for the failure to pay" an application is meant to shield the Commonwealth from liability for which it must pay directly from its treasury account. "The statute does not prevent a court from ordering the Department to disburse the *taxpayer's* property, which the Department merely holds in trust, to satisfy the *taxpayer's* debt."

Therefore, the court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

VIRGINIA-BASED U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

MENTAL HEALTH • *IN FORMA PAUPERIS* • 42 U.S.C. § 1983 • *MONELL* LIABILITY • SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

McKiver v. Ireland, No. 7:23-cv-00548, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110222 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2024) (Cullen, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The complaint failed to allege municipal liability on the part of the county based on an official custom or policy, (2) an express policy, or (3) failure to train. (4) The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

DISCUSSION: The plaintiff, a man who suffered from mental health crises, asserted a plethora of claims against nine defendants stemming from an episode that occurred on December 22, 2020. On that date, he called 911 to request a police check, claiming mental instability. An Officer responded but declined to take him to the hospital. The man called again to report that someone had pulled a gun on him at a convenience store. The 911 operator asked for the store's location in order to dispatch police from the correct jurisdiction (*i.e.*, Roanoke County or the neighboring Roanoke City), but the man could not recall. The operator explained to him, "the problem is . . . I got to have an actual location before I can just send you off to the city because they like to dump . . . things like this on us." A Roanoke County Police Officer eventually transported the man to a local hospital, where further incidents occurred, seemingly as a result of the man's poor mental health.

The man proceeded with his suit *pro se* and *in forma pauperis* (IFP). In an earlier proceeding, the court conducted the required IFP screen, leaving only 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Roanoke County and state law tort claims against the Police Officer who drove him to the hospital and hospital staff. The defendants filed motions to dismiss.

The court held first that the *Monell* claim asserting liability against Roanoke County could not proceed under the theory that the County had a custom or policy of poorly treating individuals in mental health crises. This claim rested entirely upon the Roanoke County 911 operator's statement that Roanoke City "like[s] to dump . . . things like this on us." Even assuming that the 911 operator's response was improper to the point of being a constitutional violation, the complaint contained no additional facts that could support the weighty accusation that Roanoke County employees customarily and constitutionally failed in a similar manner.

The court held second that municipal liability could not attach to the County under an express policy theory. The complaint did not impute any express unconstitutional policy to Roanoke County. "If anything, the 911 operator stated that any questionable policy belonged to Roanoke City, a neighboring jurisdiction."

The court held third that the complaint fared no better under a failure to train theory since it contained no allegation that any Roanoke County Police Officer violated the man's constitutional rights. As the court previously explained in its *sua sponte* dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the individual Officers, "[t]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid." *Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).

The court held fourth that, having dismissed the § 1983 claims, which were the lone remaining claims that provided the court with original jurisdiction over the case, it would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Therefore, the court granted Roanoke County's motion to dismiss and dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice.

POLICE • ARRESTEE • WILLFUL AND WANTON NEGLIGENCE • ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE • SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Miller v. Mormando, No. 2:23-cv-0371, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111181 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2024) (Jackson, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The arrestee stated a claim for willful and wanton negligence against the police officer. (2) The officer was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the ordinary negligence claim.

DISCUSSION: A Norfolk resident who contacted the Norfolk Police Department to report a domestic dispute filed a 10-count complaint against the arresting Officer following his subsequent arrest. According to the arrestee, after the Officer arrived at his residence, he asked the Officer to leave since no crime had been committed. Instead, the Officer entered the man's home, slammed his head to the ground, handcuffed him, and placed him in a police cruiser without telling him why he was being arrested. Instead of taking the arrestee to jail, the Officer took him to a hospital, still in handcuffs, where a doctor examined him for head injuries and a concussion. The Officer then drove away, leaving the arrestee stranded at the hospital. The Officer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss two of the claims.

The court held first that the arrestee could proceed with his claim for willful and wanton negligence against the Officer. The facts supported a plausible inference that the Officer acted with a conscious disregard for the arrestee's rights, or that he acted with reckless indifference by subjecting the arrestee to unreasonable harm.

The court held second that the Officer was entitled to immunity from the allegations of simple negligence. Virginia courts analyze four factors to determine whether sovereign immunity protects an allegedly negligent state employee: (1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement in that function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion. *See James v. Jane*, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980). Only the third and fourth factors were at issue. The court found that the Police Officer was performing law enforcement functions for the Commonwealth of Virginia, which had an interest in this function. Further, the Commonwealth exercised a sufficient degree of control over the Officer, whose actions involved judgment and discretion.

Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.

SCHOOL BOARD • STUDENT-ON-TEACHER HARASSMENT • TITLE VII • TITLE IX • DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE • RETALIATION • EQUAL PROTECTION • FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH • DUE PROCESS

Vandermeulen v. Loudoun Cnty. Sch. Bd, No. 1:24-cv-344 (MSN/IDD), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114831 (E.D. Va. June 28, 2024) (Nachmanoff, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The Title VII claims were untimely brought. (2) The school employee plausibly alleged that the school board was deliberately indifferent to her reports of harassment. (3) The school employee did not sufficiently allege the requisite discriminatory intent to support her equal protection claims. (4) The speech at issue was entitled to First Amendment protection. (5) The school employee's due process claims could not proceed because she lacked a protected property interest in her continued employment.

DISCUSSION: A special education teacher's assistant (employee) at an elementary school in Loudoun County brought several claims against the Loudoun County School Board, its former Superintendent (in his individual capacity), and its current Superintendent (in his official capacity), stemming from their response to her allegations of student harassment of a sexual nature and her subsequent speech about these events. In the spring of 2022, a student "repeatedly grabbed and groped" the employee and the special education teacher "in their genital and breast areas" more than "fifty times per day on most days." School administrators dismissed and ignored their complaints over the course of several months. The teacher complained to the school's Title IX office but was told to work with school staff. In March 2022, the employee shared her complaints with a political activist, who voiced their concerns (anonymously) at a School Board meeting. The Principal and then-Superintendent knew to whom the activist was referring and became enraged since the School Board had been in the national spotlight over its questionable handling of other sexual assault complaints. Shortly thereafter, the teacher and the employee received their first-ever negative performance evaluations. On May 12, 2022, the former Superintendent informed the employee that her employment would be terminated on June 17. On June 7, the employee spoke at a School Board meeting to complain about retaliation, and, the next day, gave a television news interview. The following day, she was placed on administrative leave for the remainder of her employment.

The employee brought equal protection, First Amendment, and due process claims against the Superintendents. Against the School Board, she alleged violations of Title VII (hostile work environment and retaliation) and Title IX (deliberate indifference and retaliation). The former Superintendent moved to dismiss the claims against him, and the School Board partially moved to dismiss all of the claims against it and the current Superintendent, except for the Title IX retaliation claim.

The court held first that the Title VII claims required dismissal since they were not timely exhausted. The employee waited longer than 300 days after she was informed of her termination to file her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) retaliation-based charge, and more than 300 days after being removed from the school's campus to file her EEOC charge related to the hostile work environment claim.

The court held second that the employee plausibly alleged that the School Board was deliberately indifferent to her reports of harassment. In addition to describing the student's groping, she alleged that the student knew of the sexual nature of his acts, and that the School Board's responses to her complaints included suggestions that she "buy an apron to cover herself over her clothes, hold cardboard in front of her genital area, and implement a 'behavior improvement plan,' which it knew [the employee] had already unsuccessfully attempted." This demonstrated the School Board's failure to institute appropriate corrective measures.

The court held third that the employee did not sufficiently allege the requisite discriminatory intent to support her equal protection claims. "The gravamen of [the employee]'s complaint is that the School Board did not take her reports seriously, and that after she spoke up about the problem publicly, it retaliated against her. But nowhere does [the employee] allege that the School Board or [the former Superintendent] did any of this because [the employee] is a woman."

The court held fourth that the employee's First Amendment claims could proceed because her speech involved an issue of public concern. Although she voiced grievances related to her personal employment, she did so in the context of a heated public debate concerning the School Board's handling of sexual assault complaints.

The court held fifth that the employee's due process claims failed since she did not possess a protected property interest in her continued employment. Her contract identified her as an at-will employee, and her allegation that the former Superintendent had told the School Board that "at-will employees are only ever non-renewed or terminated for cause" did not create a "mutually explicit" understanding that her employment was anything other than at-will.

Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss.

SCHOOLS • TRANSGENDER • STUDENT-ON-STUDENT HARASSMENT • PARENTAL RIGHTS • QUALIFIED IMMUNITY • MUNICIPAL LIABILITY • TITLE IX • INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS • INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Blair v. Appomattox Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 6:23-cv-47, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111652 (W.D. Va. June 25, 2024) (Moon, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The school officials were entitled to qualified immunity. (2) The allegations did not support municipal liability. (3) The Title IX claim could not proceed against the school board. (4) The claims for intentional interference with parental rights and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress were inadequately pled.

DISCUSSION: The grandmother/adoptive mother (mother) of a high school student sued the Appomattox County School Board (ACSB), its Superintendent, and two Guidance Counselors, alleging that they were liable for harms suffered during the student's freshman year. In August 2021, the student confided in the Guidance Counselors that she identified as a boy and reported being bullied and threatened by male classmates on her school bus. One of the Counselors advised her to use the boys' restroom, where she was later threatened, harassed, and sexually assaulted. When the Guidance Counselors contacted the student's mother, they abided by the student's request to not reveal the student's preference to use a male name, as it might upset her mother.

On August 25, 2021, the student, fearful of the ongoing harassment, decided to run away. She was subsequently abducted, raped, and trafficked by several men before being found by law enforcement in Baltimore. She remained in the temporary custody of Maryland's Department of Juvenile Services for two months before running away a second time, at which point she was again abducted and sexually abused by an adult male. She was eventually rescued by law enforcement in January 2022.

The court held first that the Superintendent and the Guidance Counselors (School Officials) were qualifiedly immune from liability because the rights that the mother asserted had been violated were not clearly established. The mother argued that the School Officials interfered with her right to direct the student's upbringing and her right to familial privacy by failing to notify her "that her troubled teenaged child has chosen to use a name and pronouns of a different gender and to use the restrooms of the other gender." Yet the mother failed to cite, nor did the court ascertain, any controlling precedent or persuasive consensus identifying such purported rights. There was, likewise, no authority to suggest that the student possessed a clearly established right to familial privacy that the School Officials had violated when they abided by her request to refrain from raising her gender identity issues with her mother.

The court held second that ACSB was not liable for the alleged constitutional claims. The complaint contained only conclusory statements with no underlying factual support with regard to ACSB's allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom of "direct[ing]

staff to not inform parents when their children expressed a discordant gender identity" and of not adequately training staff with regard to the rights asserted. And although it was unclear whether the Fourth Circuit has established that supervisory liability applies to municipalities, even if it did, this theory of liability would fail because the complaint did not adequately allege the elements of notice and deliberate indifference.

The court held third that the Title IX claim could not proceed. School boards are only liable under Title IX for student-on-student harassment when a school has made an official decision to not remedy it—*i.e.*, by exhibiting deliberate indifference. Here, the allegations presented a timeline in which the School Officials took action in response to each alleged incident of harassment in a manner that was not clearly unreasonable.

The court held fourth that the complaint did not adequately allege intentional interference with parental rights. In Virginia, this tort requires that the defendant abduct or otherwise compel or induce a minor child to leave a parent that is legally entitled to one's custody, or to not return the child to the parent. Crucially, the mother did not sufficiently allege conduct undertaken by the Guidance Counselors that directly caused her and her daughter to be physically separated.

The court held fifth that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress fell short of the necessary pleading standard. This claim was premised upon the Guidance Counselors' withholding of information, which purportedly led to the student's eventual abduction, which in turn caused the mother to experience significant emotional distress. But "[t]he casual connection between Defendants' alleged acts and Plaintiff's distress is highly attenuated, at best." Likewise, the emotional distress that the student suffered was not attributable to the Guidance Counselors' decision to not initially inform the student's mother about her desire to use a male name—a decision made at the student's request.

Therefore, the court granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.

SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES • UNPAID WAGES • VIRGINIA GAP PAY ACT • VIRGINIA OVERTIME WAGE ACT • RULE 23 CLASS CERTIFICATION • FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION

Hatcher v. County of Hanover, No. 3:23cv325, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121599 (E.D. Va. July 10, 2024) (Gibney, Jr., J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The statutory scheme permitted the deputies to pursue their class action asserting violations of the Virginia Overtime Wage Act. (2) The deputies were entitled to class certification for the state law claims, as well as to (3) conditional certification for the Fair Labor Standards Act claim.

DISCUSSION: Four Hanover County Sheriff's Deputies alleged that Hanover County improperly failed to pay them and their colleagues for time spent on duty while they drove to work. When the Deputies drove to work in their officially issued take-home vehicles, they were required to declare themselves "on duty" by either calling in on their radio or through the mobile data terminal in their vehicles, according to instructions issued during field training. Once the Deputies marked on duty, they became available to respond to calls from dispatch or to address other incidents. The Deputies moved for conditional certification for their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim, and for class certification on behalf of Hanover County's approximately 250 Sheriff's Deputies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) for their state law claims, in which they asserted violations of the Virginia Gap Pay Act (VGPA) and the Virginia Overtime Wage Act (VOWA).

The court held first that the Deputies could proceed with a Rule 23 class action on their VOWA claim. They asserted this claim under the 2021 version of the law, for which the 2021 version of the Virginia Wage Payment Act (VWPA) provided a cause of action for employees "individually, jointly, with other aggrieved employees, or on behalf of similarly situated employees as a collective action consistent with the collective action procedures of the [FLSA], 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)." Va. Code § 40.1-29(J) (2021). The County argued that, under this language, the Deputies could pursue their VOWA claim only as an FLSA collective action, not as a Rule 23 class action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern all civil actions in federal courts, and when a state rule conflicts with these federal rules, courts employ a two-step inquiry. First, they determine whether the state law and the federal rules both answer the specific question in dispute. If so, the court next determines whether the conflicting state law is substantive or procedural in nature. If procedural, the federal rules govern; if the conflicting state law is substantive in nature, the state law prevails since federal rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Here, the court determined that, even assuming the VWPA's language answers the same question as Rule 23, thereby creating a conflict, certifying a class under Rule 23 would be permitted because the FLSA-procedure language in the VWPA is procedural.

The court held second that the Deputies were entitled to class certification for their VGPA and VOWA claims. They adequately demonstrated that these claims satisfied the seven requirements for Rule 23 class certification: ascertainability, numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority.

The court held third that the Deputies met their burden of showing conditional certification to file their collective action for the alleged FLSA violation. At this early stage in the litigation, they need only have shown that notice to potential class members would be appropriate by providing some factual evidence that a class of similarly situated aggrieved employees exists. They did so by submitting declarations that Hanover County Deputies "were required to mark on and be on duty prior to the start of their scheduled

shift" as part of a "regular, consistent, and established practice," and that they did not receive overtime pay for that period of time. Hanover County argued that it was not the Deputies' employer, but the court had already ruled otherwise at the motion-to-dismiss stage, finding that Hanover County and the Sheriff acted as the Deputies' joint employer.

Therefore, the court granted the Deputies' motions.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

EIGHTH AMENDMENT • CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT • CITY ORDINANCE • PUBLIC CAMPING • HOMELESSNESS • STATUS CRIME

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 144 S. Ct. 2202 (2024) (Gorsuch, J.).

HOLDINGS: (1) The city ordinances criminalizing camping on public property did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (2) *Robinson v. California* was not implicated and its holding should not be extended.

DISCUSSION: Two homeless individuals, representing a class of "all involuntarily homeless people living in Grants Pass," Oregon (City), challenged three City ordinances as violative of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The laws in question prohibit sleeping, camping, and overnight parking on public property, including sidewalks, alleyways, and parks. Penalties for violations escalate stepwise—a fine for a first offense; an order barring individuals with multiple citations from city parks for 30 days; and the possibility of a 30-day jail sentence for violating this trespass order. The suit was initiated shortly after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Eighth Amendment barred cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances like these against homeless individuals whenever the number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction exceeded the number of "practically available" shelter beds. *See Martin v. City of Boise*, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019).

The district court entered a *Martin* injunction, finding that the 138 shelter beds available in the City's charity-run shelter were not "available" to its 602 homeless individuals because the shelter had rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and to attend religious services. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the City's petition for certiorari to review and assess the so-called "*Martin* experiment."

The Court held first that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was a "poor foundation" on which to challenge the City's public-camping laws, since this clause restrains the method or kind of punishment that a government may impose *after* a criminal conviction; it does not touch upon the question of *whether* a government may criminalize particular behavior. The punishments imposed by the ordinances in question were in no way violative of this constitutional proscription.

The Court held second that the Ninth Circuit erred in basing its decision on *Robinson v. California*, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), an outlier in which the Court read the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting a state from criminalizing the "status" of narcotics addiction. *Robinson* was not implicated here, since the City laws at issue criminalized actions that could be undertaken by any person, not the status of being homeless. Faced with the argument that the reasoning in *Robinson* should be extended to prohibit the enforcement of laws that proscribe acts that are, in some sense, involuntary (*i.e.*, because some homeless people cannot help but sleep outdoors under a blanket), the Court explained that it had already rejected this rationale in *Powell v. Texas*, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In that case, the Court upheld the conviction of a man under a Texas statute criminalizing public intoxication, rejecting his argument that his drunkenness was an involuntary byproduct of his status as an alcoholic.

Citing a more recent decision, the Court stressed that "questions about whether an individual who has committed a proscribed act with the requisite mental state should be 'reliev[ed of] responsibility,' due to a lack of 'moral culpability,' are generally best resolved by the people and their elected representatives," not by judicial fiat. *See Kahler v. Kansas*, 589 U.S. 271 (2020). Moreover, since—and arguably because of—*Martin* and its unworkable, "ill-defined involuntariness test," the problems associated with homelessness have grown worse in the western states, as attested to by the various *amici* briefs submitted by coalitions of cities and states.

Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

(Thomas, J., concurring): "First, the precedent that the respondents primarily rely upon, *Robinson* [], was wrongly decided. . . . That holding conflicts with the plain text and history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. . . . Second, the respondents have not established that their claims implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the first place."

(Sotomayor, J., joined by Kagan, J., & Jackson, J., dissenting): "Grants Pass's Ordinances criminalize being homeless. The status of being homeless (lacking available shelter) is defined by the very behavior singled out for punishment (sleeping outside). . . . The Ordinances use the definition of 'campsite' as a proxy for homelessness."

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION • FOURTH AMENDMENT • ARREST WARRANT • PROBABLE CAUSE

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 144 S. Ct. 1745 (2024) (Kagan, J.).

HOLDING: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.

DISCUSSION: A jewelry store owner filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two Police Officers for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. After purchasing what was a stolen ring for $45, the store owner refused to surrender it to the ring's rightful owners, and later to the police, citing a police department letter that he had received telling him to retain it for evidence. During his conversation with the Officers, the store owner insinuated that he was operating his business without a license. The Officers subsequently obtained an arrest warrant based on two misdemeanors (receiving stolen property and dealing in precious metals without a license) and one felony (money laundering). The Officers arrested the store owner, who was held for three days, until his arraignment. The judge found probable cause, but the court ultimately dismissed the charges when county prosecutors failed to present the case to a grand jury in a timely manner.

In support of his malicious prosecution claim, the store owner argued that the Officers lacked probable cause for the felony money laundering charge since they had no reason to think that the store owner suspected that the ring was stolen, and because the Officers could not show that the ring was worth anything close to $1,000. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed without addressing the store owner's arguments, figuring that so long as probable cause clearly existed to support the misdemeanor charges, the validity of the felony charge did not matter. This decision conflicted with those issued by three other courts of appeal, which have held that the presence of probable cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim alleging the absence of probable cause for another charge. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve this circuit split.

The Court held that, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's conclusion, a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim may succeed when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge. To determine the precise contours of a constitutional claim under § 1983, a court should identify the "most analogous" common-law tort to the constitutional harm alleged and incorporate that tort's requirements. In *Thompson v. Clark*, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), the Court determined that the gravamen of both a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and a common-law malicious-prosecution claim is "the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause." *Thompson*, 596 U.S. at 43. Thus, "[c]onsistent with both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, courts should evaluate suits like [the store owner]'s charge by charge."

In support of its holding, the Court proposed the example of a person being detained on two charges—a drug offense supported by probable cause and a gun offense built on lies. "The prosecutor, for whatever reason, drops the (valid) drug charge, leaving the person in jail on the (invalid) gun charge alone. The inclusion of the baseless charge—though brought along with a good charge—has thus caused a constitutional violation, by unreasonably extending the pretrial detention." The same conclusion would follow from the common-law principles governing malicious-prosecution suits when § 1983 was enacted, as courts in that era assessed probable cause charge by charge.

The Court declined to resolve the question of how the causation element is met when an invalid charge is accompanied by a valid charge, noting that this was not an issue that it agreed to review, and because the court below did not address the matter. Nevertheless, the Court outlined three possible tests offered by the parties and *amicus curiae*. The store owner proposed that when both valid and invalid charges are brought before a judge for a probable cause determination, any warrant issued by the judge would be irretrievably tainted; so any detention based on that warrant would be the result of the invalid charge. The United States pressed for the use of a but-for test to discover whether the invalid charge, apart from the valid one, caused a detention. The question then would be whether the judge, in fact, *would have* authorized the detention had the invalid charge not been present. The Officers advocated for a stricter test, suggesting that the question should be whether the judge, absent the invalid charge, *could have* legally authorized the detention, regardless of what he really would have done.

Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

(Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting): "*Thompson* was wrongly decided. A malicious-prosecution claim bears little resemblance to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Consider what is required to establish a claim of malicious prosecution. . . . These elements have no overlap with what is required to establish a Fourth Amendment seizure violation."

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting): "Stare for as long as you like at the Fourth Amendment and you won't see anything about prosecutions, malicious or otherwise. . . . That is not to say no constitutional hook exists for a §1983 claim addressing the malicious use of process. Rather, it seems to me only that such a claim would be more properly housed in the Fourteenth Amendment."

The opinion summarized here is available for downloading, in PDF format, from the Attorney General's website, www.oag.state.va.us/, or by clicking on the hyperlinked opinion number below.

CITY ORDINANCE • DILLON RULE • PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT • CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Op. No. 24-014, Addressed to the Honorable Carrie E. Coyner, Member, House of Delegates (July 1, 2024).

Whether the City of Hopewell may adopt an ordinance containing certain provisions related to city employment and public office holding.

The City lacks the authority to adopt these provisions.

Specifically, Delegate Coyner asked the Attorney General to issue an official advisory opinion as to the following proposed provisions of Hopewell City Ordinance No. 0424(B)(4):

> (a) Any employee . . . may be a candidate for political office but shall resign, or shall be released, from employment with the City upon successful election to political office within the City, or other political office due to the responsibilities of that office [sic] will interfere with the employee's ability to perform the duties of his/her City position.
>
> (b) Any member of the governing body who seeks employment with the City shall resign from their elected office and may be eligible for such employment one year from their date of resignation in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety and any potential conflicts of interest.
>
> (c) Any Constitutional Officer who seeks employment with the City shall resign from their elected office and may become eligible for such employment one year from the date of their resignation in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety and any potential conflicts of interest.

Under the Dillon Rule, local governments may exercise only those powers that have been expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily implied therefrom, and powers that are essential and indispensable. The proposed provisions impose restrictions on who may hold local office, and no act of the General Assembly generally grants localities the authority to adopt such rules.

Regarding restrictions on who may hold local office, Article II, § 5 of the Virginia Constitution provides that the "only" such qualifications are that the person must have been a resident of the Commonwealth for at least one year prior to the election and be qualified to vote for that office. Section 5 continues, clarifying that the General Assembly may pass laws preventing conflicts of interest, dual officeholding, and other incompatible activities by elective or appointive officials. But under the Dillon Rule, local government can formulate such measures only if the General Assembly has first enacted legislation empowering them to do so.

POSITIONS AVAILABLE

(Positions posted in order received, sorted by most recent)

James City County

Position: Attorney I/II

Deadline: 8/24/2024

Details: James City County's Circuit Court seeks an individual to provide legal research and recommendations to the Judges of the Williamsburg and James City County Circuit Court; provide overall training, direction, and supervision to law clerks; and perform related work as directed by the Judges.

Salary: $84,843–$90,000 or higher DOQ

Link/Contact: James City County Circuit Court - Attorney I/II

Town of Clifton (in Fairfax County)

Position: Outside Counsel

Deadline: 8/31/2024

Details: The Mayor and Council of the Town of Clifton require advice on an as-requested basis with respect to contracts, federal/state grants, zoning enforcement, and other compliance issues. We are seeking the principal individual who will perform these services and attend evening meetings when requested (which may be several times a year) and to address specific issues.

Individual practitioners and firms with one or more attorneys having Virginia municipal law experience and preferably located in Northern Virginia are welcome to apply.

Salary: TBD

Link/Contact: Prior to submitting proposals for services, please contact Brant Baber, Chair, Town of Clifton Legal Advisory Committee, bb@baberkal.com, 703-402-5200, to discuss your interest and qualifications.

City of Petersburg

Position: Assistant City Attorney

Deadline: Open until filled

Details: The City of Petersburg Office of the City Attorney is hiring an entry-level full-time Assistant City Attorney. The functions listed below are those that represent the majority of the time spent working in this job. The City Attorney may assign additional functions related to the type of work of the job as necessary.

- Provides support and assistance as instructed by the City Attorney in his efforts to provide legal representation of the City of Petersburg.
- Prepares, researches, and drafts legal documents as assigned including but not limited to deeds, ordinances, resolutions, and contracts.
- Prepares legal memoranda on complex legal issues.
- Provides legal advice in matters as assigned to various City employees and constitutional officers.

- Attends meetings and other functions as assigned by the City Attorney.
- Provides representation to the City on assigned cases in various civil matters including but not limited to Building Code enforcement; taxation; personnel matters; land use; zoning; FOIA; and other areas.
- Provides representation to the City on assigned cases in various administrative proceedings including but not limited to employee grievances, ABC and other state licensure proceedings; State Technical Review Board proceedings; EEOC; DEQ; SCC; and other areas.
- Prosecutes cases involving specified misdemeanor offenses and violations of City Code as assigned.

Salary: $63,159–$104,023

Link/Contact: Petersburg Assistant City Attorney

County of Goochland

Position: Deputy County Attorney

Deadline: Open until filled

Details: If you are looking for a leadership opportunity in an up-and-coming, professionally run locality, this is for you! The Goochland County Attorney's office seeks qualified applicants interested in becoming the Deputy County Attorney.

The successful candidate will assist the County Attorney in providing legal representation and counsel to the Board of Supervisors, County administration, constitutional officers, and County departments, boards, and committees. In addition to partnering with the County Attorney on some projects, the Deputy County Attorney will have independent, self-directed work and directly manage client relationships with several departments and the Planning Commission.

The specific job duties will depend upon the successful candidate's experience and interest, but could include land use, real property, procurement, contracts, and Freedom of Information Act matters. The successful candidate will have a broad knowledge of local government law paired with high standards for writing, work ethic, and initiative.

This position has the potential for a hybrid telework schedule of up to two days per week.

Admission to the Virginia Bar is required and candidates with a minimum of five years of experience in local government law are preferred.

Salary: $111,464–$144,904

Link/Contact: Goochland Deputy County Attorney

County of Prince William

Position: Assistant County Attorney

Deadline: Continuous

Details: Join a dynamic local government law office. The Prince William County Attorney's Office seeks a full-time Assistant County Attorney to render legal services to the Board of County Supervisors and the various departments and agencies of the County in civil litigation and in the provision of legal advice involving a variety of tasks related to local government law.

The successful candidate will represent the County in civil legal matters. Incumbents work under the supervision of their Deputy County Attorney. Responsibilities may include: local government land-use matters, Housing Agency matters, personnel matters, employment law, environmental law, Collective Bargaining, Subdivision submission process, and eminent domain matters.

This position will assist in the preparation of court pleadings, briefs, and opinions, and will attend meetings with and handle litigation for County departments and agencies. We are looking for a candidate with strong credentials and a zealous work ethic, and who has the ability to work with a team, while also being a self-starter. If you want to join a great place to work while doing public sector law, this is the Office for you!

Salary: $82,777–$111,033

Link/Contact: Prince William Assistant County Attorney

County of Goochland

Position: City Attorney

Deadline: Continuous

Details: Under the appointment of City Council, the Hopewell City Attorney performs work of considerable difficulty in protecting the legal interests

of the City, and serves as the chief legal advisor to Council and City Manager. As designated by Council, the City Attorney also serves as the chief legal advisor to other departments, boards, commissions, and agencies of the City in all matters affecting the interests of the City. City residency is required within mutually agreed-upon terms at time of appointment.

Examples of Duties:

- Provides oral and written legal opinions and advice on complex matters to City Council, City administration, and City departments on a daily basis.
- Attends a variety of meetings—City Council, Boards, Commissions, Committees, Authorities, etc.
- Represents the City in complex legal matters. Prepares and tries cases, including appeals to state and federal courts; processes and litigates claims against the City; and prosecutes suits, actions, and proceedings for and on behalf of the City.
- Prepares, reviews, and/or approves various complex legal documents on behalf of the City—contracts, ordinances, resolutions, bonds, bids, deeds, leases, policies, etc. Provides explanations and answers when necessary.
- Researches, interprets, and applies laws, court decisions, and other legal authority in the preparation of opinions, advice, and briefs.
- Advises on the purchase, sale, exchange, and/or leasing of properties.
- Reviews procurement matters to ensure compliance.
- Prepares and reviews legislation for General Assembly sessions. Presents to the General Assembly as necessary.
- Supervises and reviews codifications of City Code.
- Manages, supervises, and reviews the work of support staff, as well as manages the department budget, support contracts, etc.
- Membership and active engagement in local government organizations and attendance of continuing education seminars specializing in local government.

Salary: $85,000–$150,000

Link/Contact: Hopewell City Attorney

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